Over the past twenty years, macroeconomic performance has improved markedly in industrialized and developing countries alike. Both in°ation and real growth are more stable now than they were in the 1980s. This stability has been accompanied by dramatic changes in¯nancial structure. We examine the connection between these concurrent events using data from 23 developed and emerging markets countries.
Introduction
Over the past twenty years, macroeconomic performance has improved markedly in industrialized and developing countries alike. Both in°ation and real growth are more stable now than they were in the 1980s. Looking at a sample of 23 countries we see that during 1990s, in 21 of them in°ation variability fell and in 14 of them output volatility was lower than it had been during the previous decade. 1 This stability has been accompanied by dramatic changes in¯nancial structure. Not only have central banks become more independent 2 , but the nature of government intervention in banking systems has changed dramatically. The purpose of this paper is to examine the connection between these two concurrent events.
There are a number of possible explanations for the widespread improvement in economic outcomes over the past two decades. There is the very real possibility that the world has become a more stable place. If there are no shocks hitting the economy, it will surely appear stable. Alternatively, monetary policymakers may have become more skillful in carry out their stabilization objectives. That is, the monetary policy of the 1990s may have been more e±cient than it was in the 1980s. We provide evidence that policy has in fact improved, suggesting that there has been an improvement in the competence of central bankers.
The ability of policymakers to carry out their job depends crucially on their having the tools necessary to reduce in°ation and output volatility. In the majority of the countries in the world, day-to-day monetary policy means controlling short-term interest rates. The transmission of interest rate movements to domestic output and prices depends on the structure of the country's banking system, and¯nancial markets more generally. Policy shifts, as embodied in interest rate changes, are e®ective only in so far as they in°uence the level of¯nancing available to¯rms and individuals wishing to either undertake investment projects or shift consumption intertemporally.
In many countries the banking system is shielded from the impact of monetary policy through barriers created by the government. Speci¯cally, if the government 1 See Section 2 below for details. 2 See King (1999) .
owns bank assets directly, as it does in much of the world, then the decisions of the managers of the banks may not be as sensitive to normal market forces. Monetary policy that is transmitted to the real economy through its impact on bank lending will be shut down in an country in which banks are owned by the government. If policy is ine®ective, the skill of the policymakers is essentially irrelevant. But when governments shed their bank assets, they increase the scope for central banks to stabilize output and in°ation. As we show, declines in the level of bank assets owned by the government are related to improvements in both the e±ciency of monetary policy and macroeconomic performance.
A second important component of the¯nancial regulatory structure is the nature of the deposit insurance system. The presence or absence of explicit deposit insurance a®ects both the willingness of bank managers to take risks, and the extent to which rms will be able to access¯nancing directly through equity or bond issuance. We provide evidence elsewhere 3 that the presence of explicit insurance reduces the extent to which¯rms go directly to capital markets for¯nancing, increasing their dependence on banks. Since an important channel for monetary policy transmission is through bank loans, the more dependent¯rms are on banks, the more e®ective is monetary policy. Again, we¯nd that macroeconomic outcomes can be tied to changes in the deposit insurance system.
Overall, our argument proceeds in a series of steps. First, we establish in Section 2 that macroeconomic outcomes have improved. Both output and in°ation are more stable in a broad sample of countries around the world. Next, in Section 3 we discuss how it is that banks are crucial for the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy and why it is that both government bank ownership and deposit insurance systems are likely to in°uence policy's e®ectiveness. Section 4 provides data on the relationship between the loans extended by banks to the private sector and both the degree of state-bank ownership and whether or not there is explicit deposit insurance.
Next we develop a measure of the improvement in monetary policy e±ciency. This is the subject of Section 5. As we discuss in some detail, e±cient policy results in 3 See .
macroeconomic outcomes that are on the in°ation-output variability frontier. Policy cannot be e±cient if it is ine®ective, and so we expect that the ability of policymakers to do their jobs depends on the whether the banking and¯nancial systems are structured so that they can. This brings us to our conclusion in Section 6 where we show that improvements in macroeconomic outcomes can be tied to changes in regulatory structure. Section 7 an overview of the results and a discussion of alternative interpretations.
Improved Macroeconomic Outcomes
We study a sample of 23 countries, ranging from large industrial countries to small developing ones.
4 Figure 1 presents a scattered plot of in°ation and output variability for 21 of the 23 countries (Israel and Mexico excluded) in the sample, for two periods, 1982 to 1989 and 1990 to 1997. In°ation variability is measured as the squared deviation from 2%, while output variability is the deviation from a log-linear trend. All of our results are robust to measuring in°ation variability as deviation from the period average. 5 We have¯tted a hyperbolic curve through the points for each sub-period in order to show more clearly how things have changed.
We draw two conclusions from these data. First, there is the fact that the world is a more stable place. The average country has experienced a decline in both in°ation and output variability | an unambiguous improvement in macroeconomic performance.
Second, the shape of the curves clearly suggest the existence of a trade-o® between in°ation and output variability. We will not focus on that aspect of the data, but it is clearly evident in the picture. Figure 2 presents the same information country by country. We see that for 21 of the 23 countries, including all of the members of the EU, in°ation variability fell 4 The list includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
5 For France and Portugal the¯rst subperiod consisted of data from 1983:I-1989:IV, while for Korea and New Zealand we divided the sample into the subperiods 1984: I-1990 I- :IV and 1991 I- :I-1997 :IV, as a result of data restrictions. between the 1980s and the 1990s. This surely re°ects the increasing importance central banks now place on targeting in°ation, either explicitly or implicitly. 6 In°ation variability rose in only two countries in the sample, Germany and Korea. Furthermore, output variability rose in 9 countries, 7 of which are in the EU. All of this is consistent with the conclusions in Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) that the shift to in°ation targeting can move countries along an output-in°ation variability frontier.
While we could proceed with the two-dimensional measure of macroeconomic performance, it is useful to combine them together to construct a single measure of increased stability. To do this, we begin by assuming that each country's central banker seeks to minimize the weighted sum of output and in°ation variability. This social loss from unstable growth and in°ation is given by:
where ¼ and y are in°ation and output, and the weight¸is a measure of the policymaker's in°ation variability aversion.
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In order to make this summary measure of performance operational, we require a measure of¸. For this, we appeal to the work of Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause (2001) , who derive the degree of in°ation variability aversion in 23 countries from estimates of each country's volatility frontier. Speci¯cally, for each subperiod they estimate the frontier and perform a parallel shift such that the frontier will pass through the data. The estimate of¸follows from the slope of the (shifted) volatility frontier at this point. Unlike the procedure in Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) , this technique does not assume policymakers are always operating on the in°ation-output variability frontier. 7 In most circumstances, one assumes that the relative weight on in°ation and output variability in the loss is given to the central banker by elected members of the government. In an in°ation-targeting framework, the value of¸will be lower, the longer the horizon over which the central bank is instructed to bring in°ation back to its target path. Value of the loss in each subperiod is the weighted average of in°ation and output variability, with weight¸, times 100.
Variability is measured as the squared deviation of the change in the log of output from the full-sample trend and the squared deviation of the change in the log of prices from two percent. The performance gain is the percentage change in the loss from the¯rst to the second subperiod. A decline in the loss is improved performance, and is reported as a positive number. What can explain these improvements in performance? In particular, how can we explain the di®erences across countries? Our main contention is that the crosscountry variation is a consequence of changes in¯nancial structure which provided the opportunity for improvements in monetary policy making. To explore this possibility,
we now turn to a brief discussion of how it is that monetary policy a®ects in°ation and real economic activity.
3 Financial Structure and the
Transmission Mechanism
Central bankers all agree that their actions have a®ects on both in°ation and the real economy. Most researchers accept this, but disagreement over the reasons continue today. 8 While traditional theories focus on the direct impact of interest rates or exchange rates, the more recent lending view concentrates on the importance of banks in transmitting monetary impulses to the real economy.
The lending view has two parts, one that focuses on the impact of policy changes on borrower balance sheets and a second that focuses on bank loans. In both, the e®ectiveness of policy depends on capital market imperfections that make it easier for some¯rms to obtain¯nancing than others. Information asymmetries and moral hazard problems, together with bankruptcy laws, mean that the state of a¯rm's balance sheet has implications for its ability to obtain external¯nance. 9 By reducing expected future sales and by increasing the cost of rolling over a given level of nominal debt, policy-induced increases in interest rates (which are both real and nominal) cause a deterioration in the¯rm's net worth. Furthermore, there is an asymmetry of information in that borrowers (¯rms) have better information about the potential pro¯tability of investment projects than creditors (banks). As a result, as the¯rm's net worth declines, the¯rm becomes less creditworthy because it has an increased incentive to misrepresent the riskiness of potential projects | an outcome that will lead potential lenders to increase the risk premium they require when making a loan.
The asymmetry of information makes internal¯nance of new investment projects cheaper than external¯nance.
More important for the transmission mechanism per se is that some¯rms are dependent on banks for¯nance, and that monetary policy a®ects bank loan supply.
A reduction in the quantity of reserves forces a reduction in the level of deposits, which must be matched by a fall in loans. Nevertheless, lower levels of bank loans will have an impact on the real economy only insofar as there are¯rms without an alternative source of investment funds.
Substantial empirical evidence supports the importance of both capital market imperfections and¯rm dependence on bank¯nancing. Kashyap and Stein (1997) provide a summary of two types of studies. The¯rst type suggests that banks rely to a substantial extent on reservable-deposit¯nancing and that, for this reason, a contraction in reserves will prompt banks to contract their balance sheets, reducing the supply of loans. The second type establishes that there are a signi¯cant number of bank-dependent¯rms that are unable to mitigate the shortfall in bank lending with other sources of¯nance. Overall, recent research does imply the existence of a lending channel.
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Cecchetti (1999) elaborates further on the importance of¯rms' dependence of bank loans for the e®ectiveness of policy changes. He looks at how di®erences in the size, concentration, and health of the banking systems, across a sample of 16 countries, are likely to a®ect the impact of monetary policy and concludes that \countries with many small banks, less healthy bank systems, and poorer direct capital access display a greater sensitivity to policy changes than do countries with big healthy banks and deep, well-developed capital markets."
11
For our purposes here, the important conclusion is that the nature of the transmission mechanism is clearly in°uenced by the structure of a country's¯nancial system.
Furthermore, only in places where the banking system is free to react to market forces will it even be possible for policy to be transmitted through intermediaries. This immediately suggests that the ability of monetary policy to engage in stabilization will depend on the regulatory environment in which the banks function. It is to this issue that we now turn.
Regulation and Intermediation
The nature of¯nancial regulation has a profound in°uence on the intermediation process. The overarching goal of such regulation is to insure the stability of thē nancial system. In doing so, governmental oversight has an a®ect both on the structure of the¯nancial system and on the behavior of individual intermediaries.
Many regulations are subtle in both their intent and their e®ect. Others are not.
For example, La Porta, L ¶ opez-de-Silanes, Shleifer (1997, 1998) examine how a country's legal system is related to its¯nancial structure. Investors provide capital to¯rms only if they believe they will get their money back. For equity holders, this means that they must be able to vote out directors and managers who do not pay them. For creditors and holders of bonds, this means that they must have authority to repossess collateral. Furthermore, these nominal legal rights must be accompanied importance of the various channels of transmission. 11 Cecchetti (1999), p. 2. by con¯dence that the laws will be enforced. In countries where these protections are strong, equity and bond markets are broad and deep and primary capital markets will be important. By contrast, in those places were investor protections are weak, nance will come primarily through the banking system.
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The decision by governments to insure banking system liabilities either through direct ownership of banks or through deposit insurance is an pathway for regulation to a®ect intermediation. Cross-country di®erences in the extent to which governments Consistent with this, in we observe that countries with an explicit insurance scheme in place have smaller external capital markets and, possibly, a lower number of publicly traded¯rms, once di®erences in production and 12 Cecchetti (1999) discusses this in the context of the euro area.
13 See DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) who use a cross-country sample to show that deposit insurance decreases rates of return paid by banks, reduces market discipline faced by banks and their managers, and increases banks' risk taking. DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) extend this analysis,¯nding that deposit insurance increases the probability of banking crises. growth are controlled. Our model and empirical¯ndings suggest that an increase in deposit insurance, either implicit or explicit, reduces equity issuance and may reduce the number of¯rms issuing equity. The reason for this is that increasing depositor's protection makes bank deposits more attractive than the (riskier) equity shares, requiring higher rates for the latter and resulting in a lower issuance of stocks.
The importance of state bank ownership on the size of the private loan market is easy to establish. To do this, using our sample of 23 countries, we look at the relationship between the share of banking system assets owned by the government and the size of bank loans (as a percentage of GDP).
14 Figure 3 presents a scatter diagram of data on these two quantities, for the year 1995, together with a simple regression line.
Consistent with the¯ndings of Barth, Caprio and Levine (1999) and La Porta, L ¶ opez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000), we¯nd a negative correlation. That is, countries in with higher government bank ownership have a lower level of overall credit extended to the private sector.
Taking this one step further, we look at the change from 1985 to 1995 in state bank ownership and its relationship with changes in outstanding bank credit. The result in Table 2 is fairly clear. Those countries in which the government has shed direct control of bank assets, and so the banking system has become less centralized, have experienced an increase of bank loans to the private sector.
Clearly, the regulatory system shapes the¯nancial intermediation system in important ways. Given the importance of banks in the monetary transmission process, this leads us to conclude that regulation is important for monetary policy e®ective-ness. In particular, we expect that in countries where state-owned banks are important monetary policy will be weaker since the size and terms of government-controlled bank loans are commonly not market oriented.
When loans rates are not market determined, monetary policy's impact is clearly blunted. The consequences for private sector activity of a change in the short-term interest rate controlled by the central bank will have a lower impact on the lending of 14 The appendix contains a full description of all of the data, as well as selected series. Values are the averages for 23 countries. For state-owned bank assets, the number are as a percentage of the total in the largest ten banks. For explicit deposit insurance, the reported value is the percentage of countries with an explicit system.
state-owned banks that it would on privately owned banks operating in a competitive environment. If the behavior of banks is una®ected by policy actions, there will be no lending channel to transmit monetary policy to the economy, leaving much less scope for policymakers to achieve their objectives.
Turning to deposit insurance, we expect bank loan¯nancing to be relatively more important than equity¯nancing in the presence of deposit insurance. This implies that countries which have adopted an explicit insurance system should exhibit¯rms with a higher dependence on bank loans as a means of¯nancing. To study this possibility, using data from Table I of DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) we construct a measure of the evolution of each country's deposit insurance regime from 1985 to 1995. Our data is normalized so that`1' represents instituting an insurance system between 1985 and 1995,`0' represents no change, and`-1' the elimination of the explicit insurance system between 1985 and 1995.
Our expectation is that a shift toward an explicit insurance, for a given level of state bank ownership, will drive¯rms into the banking system, decreasing equity issuance and increasing bank dependence. The impact on the actual level of credit extended by banks to private¯rms is ambiguous. The results in Table 2 show that, between 1985 and 1995, the level of state bank ownership declined on average while the proportion of countries with explicit deposit insurance increased. Overall, the amount of private credit extended (relative to GDP) also rose. The results presented in the right-most column of the table suggest that the change in from banks to the private sector is negatively correlated with the change in state-owned bank assets, but is uncorrelated with the change in the deposit insurance system.
As we discuss in our earlier work, , this does not mean that deposit insurance is irrelevant for¯nancial structure. There we report evidence that the presence of deposit insurance a®ects the intermediation mechanism primarily through its impact on the size of equity markets. Countries with explicit deposit insurance have a external capital markets to GDP ratio to that is roughly ten percentage points lower than those that do not. 15 If deposit insurance reduces the reliance of¯rms on equity¯nancing, dependence on bank loans will rise. This strengthens the lending channel, broadening the e®ectiveness of monetary policy.
Overall, it is clear that changes in government involvement in the¯nancial sector have precipitated important changes in the intermediation. The degree to which banking activity is driven by market mechanisms has changed in a number of countries, with potentially important consequences for the monetary transmission mechanism.
In particular, we see that in a number of countries the state has shed its banking assets and restructured its deposit insurance system in ways that are likely to make for increased e®ectiveness of monetary policy. We now proceed to study whether these changes can be tied to both measured improvements in macroeconomic outcomes and changes in the e±ciency of monetary policy.
Measuring the E±ciency Monetary Policy
In looking at the improvement in macroeconomic outcomes documented in Section 2 we noted several possible explanations. One alternative is that the combined reduction in output and in°ation volatility is a consequence of improved monetary policy. That is, central banks may have become more competent and moved their economies closer to the output-in°ation variability frontier. To study this possibility, we need to estimate the change in policy e±ciency between 1980s and the 1990s.
To construct a simple measure of the change in central bank e±ciency, we begin by assuming that central bankers move their interest rate instrument in a manner designed to minimize the simple weighted sum of output and in°ation variability that is the loss L in equation (1) . In carrying out their stabilization objective, the policymakers must take account of various types of unexpected events. For convenience, we divide these shocks into two groups: (1) those that move output and in°ation in the same direction and we label demand shocks; and (2) those that move output and in°ation in opposite direction and we label supply shocks. The policymaker's interest rate instrument is like a demand shock, as it moves output and in°ation up and down together.
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The best possible monetary policy will completely neutralize demand shocks, but faces a trade-o® when confronted with supply shocks. Since supply shocks move output and in°ation in opposite directions, a policymaker must decide whether to stabilize in°ation, thereby destabilizing output even further, or the reverse. The decision depends on the tastes as embodied in the weight¸from the objective function.
Returning to the problem, we see that if policy is optimal, then the correlation between in°ation and output (measured as deviations from the desired paths) will be minus one. This immediately implies that the product of the variances minus the squared covariance has a lower limit of zero. 17 Writing this as h, we study the properties of:
where i is the time period over which h(i) is computed. As h(i) falls, monetary policy improves. We go on to examine the change in policy e±ciency from the 1980s to the 1990s using:
When policy e±ciency increases, the measure e rises. Furthermore, and as we show in the appendix, this measure is robust to changes in the variance of demand and/or supply shocks that are common to all countries. Results are for simple regressions of the gain in monetary policy e±cient e plotted in Figure 4 on the change in the percentage of bank assets owned by the state and the change in the deposit insurance system P-values use standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. Our primary interest is in whether the distribution of changes in policy e±ciency across countries can be explained by di®erences in the evolution of¯nancial regulatory structures. To examine this, we simply regress the measure of improved monetary policy, e, on the change in the extent of state bank ownership and the change in explicit deposit insurance. Because it is such an outlier, we examine the case both with and without Israel. The results, reported in Table 3 show that point estimates are as we expect. That is, a decline in state bank ownership and switch to explicit deposit insurance are both associated with improvements in monetary policy.
We have now established the main links in our argument. The regulatory structure, especially direct state ownership of banking system assets and the character of the deposit insurance system, a®ect the structure of¯nance. The lower the level of direct governmental ownership of banks, the more loans are extended to the private sector. Second, we have established that changes in¯nancial structure have an impact on the scope of monetary policy to stabilize the economy. In this section we showed how improved e±ciency of monetary policy, as measured by the extent to which policy neutralizes demand shocks, is linked to the certain key changes in the regulatory structure. We are now ready to return to the primary question raised earlier: Can changes in¯nancial regulation, by allowing for more e±cient central bank policy, explain the improved overall economic performance we have witnessed over the past two decades in a large major of countries? This is the subject of the next section.
Explaining the Performance Improvements
Do changes in the¯nancial regulatory environment provide a partial explanation for the measured improvement in macroeconomic outcomes? We address this question in two di®erent ways. First, we show that improved policy e±ciency has led to stability. And second, we examine the relationship between the performance gain and the our measures of¯nancial structure. Our expectation is that a reduction in direct governmental ownership of banks and introduction of explicit deposit insurance should enhance the stability of both in°ation and output. Figure 5 plots the performance gain (from Table 2 Results are for simple regressions of the performance gain from Table 1 on the change in the percentage of bank assets owned by the state and the change in the deposit insurance system. P-values use standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.
The solid line plotted in Figure 5 is the bivariate regression line, excluding Israel.
There is a clear positive slope, implying that countries with improvements in policy e±ciency also experienced macroeconomic performance gains.
Turning to the direct relationship of changes in¯nancial structure on changes in performance, we take the measures of performance gain reported in Table 1 and regress them on the changes in state-owned bank assets and deposit insurance system.
Focusing on the second column, the results excluding Israel, we obtain the results we had hoped for. Countries that either reduced the level of direct state-bank ownership or instituted explicit deposit insurance experienced more profound macroeconomic improvements. That is, the coe±cient estimates are of the expected sign and the reduced level of state-bank ownership is statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the 5% level of better. Furthermore, these two variables are able to explain 40% of the variation in the performance data for this sample of 22 countries.
We note that these results are robust to a number of changes in the exact methods used to compute them. As we mentioned above, computing in°ation variability as deviations from the mean of the two subsamples, rather than as deviations from 2%, has virtually no impact on the results. We also examined the ability of alternative measures of the¯nancial regulatory environment to explain the changes in performance. But, with the exception of the deposit insurance and state-bank ownership variables that we include, we were unable to discern any material changes that could have generated the results. Overall, we conclude that these e®ects are large. In the case of Mexico, for example, decline in the loss that is related to two changes in the environment is roughly equivalent to a decline in the standard deviation of in°ation from 62.7% in the 1980s to 24.3% in the 1990s (both assuming that the in°ation objective is two percent).
That is, we can trace the change in banking-system ownership and the institution of deposit insurance to a more than¯fty percent reduction in in°ation volatility.
Conclusions
Over the past twenty years, macroeconomic performance has improved worldwide. At the same time,¯nancial systems have evolved. In particular, government 21 See Table 12 of Barth, Caprio and Levine (1999 There are surely many alternative interpretations that could be given to the collection of facts we have assembled here. For example, it could be that there is some fundamental driving force that is reduced state ownership of commercial bank assets, introduction of explicit deposit insurance, improved monetary policy e±ciency and macroeconomic stability all at the same time. A candidate would be the presence of nancial crises arising from generally poor¯scal and regulatory policies prior during the 1980s. These crises could have led to all of these changes simultaneously.
It is di±cult to rule out the possibility that some combination of local and global phenomena caused the regulatory and policy changes as well as reduced volatility. If this were so, our interpretation would be incorrect. We do believe, however, that our results are suggestive that the measure improvements in monetary policy e±ciency are a result of changes in¯nancial structure, and that it is these that produced the more stable output and in°ation share world-wide.
Appendix I: Measuring Policy E±ciency
In this appendix we derive the measure for policy e®ectiveness h(i) in equation (2), as well as the change in policy e®ectiveness e in equation (3) . To do this, we consider the policymaking as an optimal control problem in which central bankers set their interest rate instrument in order to minimize the loss given by equation (1), subject to the constraints that are imposed by the structure of the economy.
To begin, we assume that policymakers minimize the loss function
where E denotes the mathematical expectation, ¼ is in°ation, y is the (log) of aggregate output, ¼ ¤ and y ¤ are the desired levels of in°ation and output, and¸is the relative weight given to squared deviations of output and in°ation from their desired levels.
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Minimization of this loss requires knowledge of the determinates of deviations of output and in°ation from their desired levels. We assume that two random shocks push y and ¼ away from y ¤ and ¼ ¤ . The¯rst shock | the aggregate demand shock (d)
| moves output and in°ation in the same direction; the second shock | the aggregate supply shock (s) | moves output and in°ation in opposite directions. Policy is only capable of moving output and in°ation in the same direction, and so is analogous to an aggregate demand shock.
A simple textbook aggregate demand and aggregate supply is su±cient for the task at hand. 23 The aggregate demand curve is the negative relationship between (¼ ¡ ¼ ¤ ) and (y ¡ y ¤ ) that is shifted by the demand shock (d) and interest rate policy changes (r):
22 An alternative speci¯cation of the loss function would include interest rate variability as a policy concern. This would imply that interest rate volatility should have fallen in countries with improved performance. However, this is not the case in the data.
23 Romer (2000) provides a very description of how to derive this simple model.
where ! is the slope coe±cient.
Analogously, aggregate supply is the positive relationship between in°ation deviations and output deviations that is shifted by the supply shock (s). We can write this as
Normalizing ± and¯to be speci¯c functions of°and !, we can write the reduced form of the system (2) and (3) as
where ± and¯have been chosen to yield this simple form.
The quadratic objective and linear economic structure means that the optimal policy response to demand and supply shocks is a simple linear rule. That is, the instrument response is of the form r = ad + bs;
where a and b are the degree to which policy reacts to the two shocks. Minimizing the loss, subject to the constraint imposed by the structure of economy, yields optimal values for the reaction parameters a and b, which we label a¤ and b ¤ . These are simply a ¤ = 1 (7)
An optimal policy has two parts,¯rst the authorities completely neutralize all demand shocks, and second they accommodate supply shock depending on structural parameters (!;°) and their preferences (¸).
We measure e±ciency by estimating how close outcomes are to those that would be implied by this optimal policy. To derive a measure,¯rst note that for any policy the variances of output and in°ation, as well as their covariance are given by Our measure of e±ciency is based on the quantity
If policymakers adopt the optimal policy, this is zero. That is h ¤ = 0, as policymakers will eliminate all aggregate demand shocks, leaving only aggregate supply shocks which generate a correlation of minus one between output and in°ation. The measure h is based on the coe±cient of variation of in°ation and output, and will be zero when they are perfectly correlated.
In general,
Looking at (13) we see that closer a is to a ¤ = 1, the closer h is to zero. It is also true that h declines with both ¾ 2 s and ¾ 2 d . As the world becomes calmer overall this measure of the level of e±ciency appears to decline. We discuss how we handle this issue below.
We study the change in h by taking the log of the ratio of its level in the¯rst period to that in the second. That is, we look at is common to all of the countries in our sample, then the cross-country variation in e gives us a measure of the relative improvement in policy e±ciency allowing us to focus on the cross-sectional determinates of e.
It is worth making two observations about our measure e. First, if either shocks are not perfectly observable or if policy can only react with a lag, then it will be impossible to completely neutralize demand shocks. In this more realistic case, it will be impossible for policy makers to adjust their instrument to insure that (¼ ¡ ¼ ¤ )
and (y ¡ y ¤ ) are perfectly negatively correlated, and so h ¤ will deviate from zero.
Fortunately, this does not a®ect our measure of the change in policy e±ciency.
Finally, we note that our measure of e±ciency is will be related to changes in the credibility of policymakers but not its level. If a policymakers becomes more credible, then this will reduce the in°ation bias and generate a movement toward the e±ciency frontier. Lack of credibility itself, however, should not have an impact on the ability of a skillful central banker to neutralize demand shocks. 
